Technology licensing officers play an important role in the commercialization process of university inventions. Because the rights to inventions of faculty, staff and students at U.S. universities, as well as most universities in Europe, belong to the institutions where those inventions were made, technology licensing officers regulate which inventions should be commercialized. In this respect, technology licensing officers evaluate invention disclosures and select the inventions they believe are valuable to industry. However, most university inventions are in such an early stage of development that there is much uncertainty regarding their potential. Research on the evaluation of science and technology shows that evaluators are influenced by the status of the actors associated with new work; particularly in situations where there is uncertainty about the quality of an innovation. To examine whether inventor status influences technology licensing officers' evaluation of inventions, we conducted two randomized experiments with technology licensing officers at United States research universities. Our experiments reveal that licensing officers are influenced by inventor status and that the inventions of high status inventors are perceived to have more commercial potential. These findings are important to better understand the role of inventor attributes and the decisions of technology licensing officers in commercialization processes of university inventions.
IntroductIon
Although the growing body of research on technology commercialization at academic institutions has provided valuable insights, scholars have tended to abstract from examining the role of the technology licensing office in the commercialization process (Jensen, Thursby, & Thursby, 2003) . Relatively little attention has gone out to the activities within technology licensing offices, even though there is potentially much to be gained from researching the practices in these offices (Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo, & Veugelers, 2007; Thursby & Kemp, 2002) . Despite the fact that several studies have touched on the difficulties of evaluating the commercial potential of earlystage university inventions (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Shane, 2004) , very few scholars have empirically addressed this issue. In particular, the role of technology licensing officers in selecting which inventions will be commercialized has remained unexplored.
Technology licensing officers play a key role in the commercialization process (Clarysse et al., 2005; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003; Thursby & Thursby, 2002) . Because the property rights to inventions made by faculty, staff and students belong to the institutions where these inventions were developed, technology licensing officers often regulate which inventions are commercialized. The decision to invest in the commercial development of a new technology depends on licensing officers' assessment of the commercial potential of the invention. However, most university inventions are in such an early stage of development that there is much uncertainty regarding the commercial potential of these inventions, making the evaluation of inventions a challenging activity. Literature on the evaluation of science and technology shows that evaluators are influenced by the status of the actors associated with the new work (Merton, 1968; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny, 1993 Podolny, , 1994 . Hence, technology licensing officers may be influenced by the status of the inventors who disclose inventions when evaluating the commercial potential of new scientific discoveries.
To explore whether inventor status influences technology licensing officers' evaluation of new inventions we conducted 2 randomized experiments (n= 122, n= 121) with technology licensing officers at United States research universities. The technology licensing officers were asked to evaluate identical invention disclosures, in which we manipulated inventor status. As a result we found statistically significant differences in how licensing officers evaluate the commercial potential of inventions, depending on the inventor's status.
Our findings are important to researchers and practitioners in several ways. First, they provide insight into the role of inventor attributes, thereby rebalancing the literature's focus on the (technological) attributes of the inventions themselves. Second, they help us to better understand the decisions of technology licensing officers about university inventions. The results identify the preferences of licensing officers for particular types of inventors, alluding to possible biases of licensing officers in the evaluation of new inventions. This paper proceeds as follows. In the theory section we elaborate on the evaluation of university inventions and the role of status in the evaluation of scientific and technological work. Next, we discuss the experimental research methodology and results followed by a discussion our findings.
theory

Invention Disclosure Evaluation
After disclosure to the university's technology licensing office, licensing officers evaluate new inventions and select only those inventions they believe have commercial potential (Jensen et al., 2003) . Such evaluation is necessary to decide on which inventions are worthy of investment, for example in the form of intellectual property protection (Roberts & Malone, 1996; Siegel et al., 2003) . The decision to seek patent protection on an invention depends on licensing officers' assessment of the commercial potential and patentability of the invention. In this respect, licensing officers evaluate whether the invention is novel and non-obvious to a person trained in the prior art, offers valuable technological advance and can be embodied in some form that can be patented (Sine et al., 2003; Shane, 2004) . In addition, licensing officers consider the salability of inventions by assessing their value to potential licensees (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) . The patenting decision is not a trivial decision since universities typically have only limited funds for commercialization efforts (Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, & Link, 2004) and from an economic perspective patents are only worth the investment if licensing income is expected to exceed the costs of patenting (Shane, 2004) . Part of the patenting decision 2 Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 17, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss17/1 involves whether to seek domestic and/or international patent protection; while domestic patent protection is considerably less expensive it is often less valuable to potential licensees, particularly when foreign markets are considered to be highly profitable (Siegel et al., 2003) . So although patents make for a superior form of intellectual property protection because of the legal monopoly they provide, not all inventions can be patented (Sine et al., 2003) . Hence, licensing officers face the challenging task of assessing which inventions will generate positive returns (Elfenbein, 2007 ).
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Yet, most university inventions are little more than a proof of concept, and in such an early stage of development that no one really knows their commercial potential (Jensen and Thursby, 2001) . Even inventors have reported to experience difficulties in evaluating the commercial potential of their own inventions (Baldini, Grimaldi, & Sobrero, 2007) . It is under conditions of uncertainty that technology licensing officers are required to assess the commercial value of inventions, often even before industry has expressed any interest (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Siegel et al., 2003) .
Findings on the evaluation of science and technology indicate that evaluators are sensitive to the status of the actors associated with new technologies and scientific work (Merton, 1968; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny, 1993 Podolny, , 1994 . This suggests that the evaluation of inventions by technology licensing officers may be contingent on the status of inventors. To understand why technology licensing officers are likely to be influenced by inventor status we will now turn to the literature on the role of status in the evaluation of science and technology to foreshadow its relevance in the evaluation of university inventions.
Status
The literature on status covers topics such as the attainment, maintenance and consequences of status (see Chen, Peterson, Phillips, Podolny, & Ridgeway, 2012; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012) . For the purpose of this study we are interested in the consequences or effects of status. The effect of status occurs when actors are accorded differential recognition for their efforts, depending on their location in a status ordering, holding constant the quality of these efforts (Azoulay, Stuart, & Wang, 2011) . Status effects have been observed in various social and organization contexts (Chen et al., 2012) but are particularly salient in situations concerning the evaluation of science and technology.
In Merton's (1968) seminal work on the Matthew effect in science, he demonstrates how the evaluation process of scientific work is subject to status effects. Merton defines this Matthew effect (p. 58) as "…the accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark". Hence, higher status scientists get disproportionately great credit for their work while lower status scientists tend to get disproportionately little credit for comparable contributions. Such judgments about the work of high status scientists may be systematically biased by a number of factors such as respect, doubts of one's own competence to criticize a renowned scientist or by fear of offending an influential actor (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971) .
With respect to the evaluation of new technologies, Podolny (1993) argues that status can function as a signal or indicator of underlying or unobservable quality. He states that implicit and explicit promises of higher-status actors regarding the quality of their products are more likely to be accepted and that there is a greater reluctance to accept the quality claims of lower-status actors, even if both claim to produce the same quality. That is, status functions to resolve uncertainty about underlying quality (Azoulay et al., 2011) . In their study on innovation in the semiconductor industry, Podolny and Stuart (1995) note that inherent technical properties often fail to serve as reliable guides for successful innovations and point out that technical characteristics alone cannot sufficiently inform decisions about which technologies to develop. Due to the uncertainty surrounding predictions of the potential of innovations, the status of the actors associated with the innovation will become important to consider. An actor's status is then used to evaluate the importance of the actor's innovation and indirectly serves as evidence of the quality. Hence, when there is uncertainty about the quality of an innovation, decision-makers are more likely to rely on status in their evaluation (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny, 1993 Podolny, , 1994 Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) .
In line with the signaling function of status in the evaluation of technology (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny, 1993 Podolny, , 1994 Stuart et al., 1999) inventor status can thus help licensing officers to resolve uncertainty about the quality of a university invention. Similarly, inventor status is expected to influence licensing officers' evaluations according to the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) where higher status inventors are expected to receive more acclaim for producing similar inventions compared to lower status inventors.
To investigate the role of inventor status in university technology commercialization, this study explores whether inventor status influences technology licensing officers' evaluation of new inventions.
experIments
The empirical examination of status effects is not without challenges. Any effects of status should be investigated while holding the quality of an actor's work constant and by controlling for the specific attribute(s) that constitute an actor's status (Berger, Conner, & Fisek, 1974; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980) . Azoulay et al. (2011) note that in practice, it is very difficult to adhere to this ceteris paribus proviso of constant quality. In the context of university technology commercialization, it would be particularly problematic to control for the quality of early-stage university inventions due to the amount of uncertainty inherent in such inventions and the commercialization process (Colyvas et al., 2002; Shane, 2004) .
To investigate a potential causal relationship between inventor status and the perceived commercial potential of inventions -holding constant the quality of these inventions -we conducted 2 randomized experiments (2x1 between-subjects design) where we manipulated inventor status in otherwise similar invention disclosures. Each experiment focused on a different invention disclosure. During the experiments, active technology licensing officers at U.S. universities were asked to evaluate these invention disclosures. An experimental design was chosen as it allows to: (1) control the quality of the university inventions and (2) isolate the status effect by employing specific one-dimensional conceptualizations of inventor status, thereby eliminating the need to control for other characteristics that could influence perceived status. Each experiment was designed to test a specific operationalization of inventor status. The status treatments were selected on the basis of an interview with the director of a technology licensing office at an authors' university. In addition, we made sure that the treatments were realistically incorporated in the invention disclosures.
The invention disclosures were modified from actual university invention disclosures submitted at an authors' university. The modification was done in conjunction with the director of 4
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 17, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss17/1 the technology licensing office to ensure that the disclosures were realistic and representative of the disclosures seen by university technology licensing officers (this office did not participate in the study). The invention disclosures included information on a new invention, accompanied by background information on the inventor such as current academic position and educational background. Each experiment was designed around a separate invention disclosure, testing for a specific inventor status treatment; the information in the disclosure was kept completely identical except for the specific status treatment.
Measures
In conjunction with the director of the technology licensing office at one of the author's university, we formulated 3 measures to capture licensing officers' evaluation of the invention. The measures were formulated to realistically reflect how licensing officers consider the commercial potential of an invention. They measure how valuable licensing officers believe the invention to be to industry, as well as licensing officers' recommendation for domestic and for international patent application. In addition to their practical relevance, which is essential when involving actual technology licensing officers, these measures are also consistent with academic literature on university technology transfer (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Siegel et al., 2003) . The experiment included the following questions (with answers on a five point scale): (1) "How valuable do you believe this invention would be to industry?" (1= not at all valuable, 5= one of the most valuable inventions the university has available for licensing), (2) "How likely are you to recommend that the university applies for a U.S. patent on this invention?" (1= very unlikely, 5= very likely), (3) "How likely are you to recommend patenting this technology in the major markets for it outside the United States?" (1= very unlikely, 5= very likely). Before administration, the experiment was pre-tested by licensing officers from the technology transfer office at that university.
Sample
To obtain subjects for the experiments, we contacted the technology licensing office directors at 223 Carnegie I research universities in the United States and asked their offices to participate in the study. All offices that agreed to participate would receive a $50 gift card as a token of our gratitude. At those licensing offices that agreed to participate, we asked the director for the contact information of their licensing officers to send them an invitation to participate in the online experiment. We sent each licensing officer an email that included a password-protected link to the online experiment accompanied by a unique (anonymous) login code and password combination to gain access to the experiment. The unique login information ensured confidentiality of both the invention disclosures and the licensing officers' responses. For each experiment, we randomly assigned licensing officers to the treatment or control groups (except for the specific status treatment, both groups received identical invention disclosures). Participants were required to complete the entire experiment in a single session and were not able to modify or complete their answers at a later point in time. Furthermore, we asked each participant to provide us with the following information: gender, age, experience (number of years working as a licensing officer), highest academic degree and the technical field in which they obtained their highest degree.
Experiment 1: Department Chair vs. Regular Faculty Member
In the first experiment, inventor status was operationalized as an inventor holding the position of department chair. This operationalization was selected on the basis of an interview with the director of a technology licensing office at an authors' university. In academic departments, the department chair is the leader (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Wolverton, Ackerman, & Holt, 2005) and thus enjoys a higher status compared to other faculty members. The department chair has the power and responsibility to influence institutional policies and procedures; recommends faculty for appointment, promotion, and tenure; controls budgets and establishes or maintains departmental cultures (Tucker, 1984) . Moreover, the department chair represents the department's faculty members to the rest of the institution, professional organizations, and clients outside the university (Carroll & Wolverton, 2004) .
In this experiment, licensing officers were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: the treatment group received an invention disclosure submitted by an inventor that currently holds the position of department chair (full professor and department chair), while the control group received an invention disclosure submitted by a regular faculty member (full professor and not department chair). In both conditions the inventor holds de position of full professor, as in the normative career path of department chairs full professorship precedes department chair appointment (Carroll, 1991) . Table 1 provides descriptive information on the sample of licensing officers that participated in this experiment. To check the random assignment of licensing officers to treatment and control groups, we compared the treatment and control groups on several licensing officer characteristics. Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, and t-tests for the comparison of treatment and control groups. The overall similarity of the treatment and control groups indicates that randomization had its desired effect.
The basic outcome of the experiment is presented in Table 3 , which gives an overview of the effects of the status treatment; the results of our statistical analysis are presented in Table 4 . The results of the experiment indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the treatment and control group with respect to how valuable licensing officers believe the invention to be. However, the licensing officers are more likely to recommend both domestic and international patent application if the inventor is a department chair.
Experiment 2: National Academy of Sciences Member vs. Regular Faculty Member
In the second experiment, inventor status was operationalized as an inventor who was elected a member of the National Academy of Sciences. This operationalization was also selected on the basis of an interview with the director of a technology licensing office at an authors' university. "The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is a private, non-profit society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the public good. [...] Members are elected to the National Academy of Sciences in recognition of their distinguished and continuing achievements in original research. Membership is a widely accepted mark of excellence in science and is considered one of the highest honors that a scientist can receive." ("National Academy of Sciences," n.d.).
In the experiment, licensing officers were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: the treatment group received an invention disclosure with an inventor who was elected a member of the National Academy of Sciences and currently holds the position of full professor, while the control group received the same invention but submitted by an inventor holding the position of full
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Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 17, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss17/1 professor. To check the random assignment of licensing officers to treatment and control groups, we compared the treatment and control groups on several licensing officer characteristics. Table  2 shows the means, standard deviations, and t-tests for the comparison of treatment and control groups. For most licensing officer characteristics there are only small, non-significant differences between the treatment and control groups except for years of experience and the proportion of participants with a business and law background. However, the overall non-significant differences between treatment and control groups show the randomization had its desired effect.
The basic outcome of this experiment is presented in Table 3 , which gives an overview of the effects of the status treatment; the results of our statistical analysis are presented in Table 4 . The licensing officers who received random assignment of an inventor who was elected a member of NAS believe the invention to be significantly more valuable compared to the officers who received an invention disclosure submitted by an inventor who was not. With respect to recommending patent application, licensing officers are more likely to recommend international patent application if the inventor is a NAS member.
dIscussIon
The experiments conducted in this study provide direct evidence of the causal effect of inventor status on technology licensing officers' views of inventions. We found statistically significant differences in licensing officer's evaluation of the commercial potential of inventions, depending on inventor status. Our findings indicate that inventions by high-status inventors are perceived as more valuable to industry and are more likely to be recommended for patenting.
In particular, we find that the inventions by department chairs are more likely to be recommended for both domestic and internal patent protection. This suggests that licensing officers perceive inventions by department chairs differently and are more willing to invest in intellection property protection. However, we did not find a significant effect of the department chair treatment for the invention's perceived value to industry. Our results also indicate that inventions by National Academy of Sciences members are perceived more valuable to industry and are more likely to be recommended for patenting outside the US. These findings suggest that department chairs and National Academy of Sciences members will be more likely to see their inventions commercialized than the technological characteristics of the inventions alone would suggest.
Implications
Our findings have several important implications. First, this study shows how research on university technology commercialization can potentially gain from investigating how social structure enter into the decision-making processes of technology licensing officers (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Podolny, 1993) . By highlighting the role of inventor status, our results extend prior findings on the importance of inventor characteristics when evaluating the commercial potential of inventions (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Shane, 2004; Siegel et al., 2003) , thereby rebalancing the literature's focus on the (technological) attributes of the inventions themselves (Podolny & Stuart, 1995) . Future research on university technology commercialization should therefore include the sociological processes inherent in the evaluation and commercialization of university inventions.
Second, we show that the incorporation of status processes can help us to better understand the decisions of technology licensing officers about university inventions. Our results provide insight into how technology licensing officers influence the process of technology commercialization by showing that they are sensitive to inventor status when evaluating new inventions. Licensing officers may rely on inventor status to resolve uncertainty about the quality of a university invention (Podolny & Stuart, 1995) and use it as a signal (Podolny, 1993) of the technical and market value of an invention. As such, inventor status may provide a sense of credibility to claims about the invention that are hard to ascertain (Shane & Khurana, 2003; Shane, 2004) . Alternatively, licensing officers could be biased in their evaluation of the work of high status faculty members (Merton, 1968) , which may have resulted in less careful assessments with less strict criteria (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971) .
To assess the desirability of the status effects we found, future research should address to which degree inventor status can indeed be seen as a valid proxy or signal of underlying technological quality or tacit knowledge. However, directly linking the commercial success of a university invention to the status of its inventor(s) may be problematic. Podolny and Stuart (1995) caution that if an actor's status is expected to lead others to favorably evaluate its innovations, it implies only that on average there will be an ex post positive correlation between an actor's status and the acknowledged importance of that actor's innovations. The authors also note that if inventions associated with high-status actors are more likely to be rapidly further developed than competing ones, these inventions will appear as superior ex post despite the fact that they may not have been superior ex ante.
It has been argued that industry is also sensitive to inventor characteristics and that inventors' academic status attracts the attention of potential licensees and can signal quality to scientific and financial communities (Allen, Link, & Rosenbaum, 2007; Audretsch & Stephan, 1996; Elfenbein, 2007) . Given these findings, scholars should investigate whether status effects (found in this study, or in general) translate to industry evaluations of university technologies.
Limitations
Our study has some limitations. First, our decision to conduct a randomized experiment to examine the causal effect of inventor status on licensing officer evaluation resulted in a stylized research setting. Although we took several measures to make our experiment realistic, the licensing officers were asked to conduct a simplified and time constrained evaluation process in place of a more iterative multistage selection process (Shane, 2004) . Moreover, some inventor status characteristics (like National Academy of Sciences membership) might not always be contained in the invention disclosure document. Therefore, our experimental design might have made a clearer association between those attributes and the invention itself than is normally the case when university licensing officers evaluate invention disclosures. While we have no evidence to suggest that our results are an artifact of the stylized nature of research design, it is possible that the patterns we observed were either over or understated as a result of it.
Second, the treatments used in this experiment were selected on the basis of interview data with the director of a technology licensing office and prior research. Future research should look into which other inventor status characteristics licensing officers might be sensitive to when evaluating university inventions. Research, Vol. 33 [2013], Iss. 17, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol33/iss17/1 Third, our findings may not be generalizable to technology transfer offices outside the US. Although we have no evidence to suggest that our results would not generalize to other countries, additional research would be needed to show that they would. Cultural differences, for instance, might lead licensing officers elsewhere to respond differently to the status treatments we employed.
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conclusIon
In short, technology licensing officers play an important role in influencing the commercialization of university inventions because they must often make recommendations about which inventions should be commercialized. The randomized experiments demonstrate that licensing officers are influenced by the status of the inventors who disclose the inventions. In particular, the inventions of high status inventors are believed to have more commercial potential. These findings provide significant ground for future research on status processes in university technology commercialization. 
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